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The music and software industry are employing copy-protection devices in CDs and digital downloads 
to strengthen their weak appropriability regimes that leave ample opportunities for modern-day piracy. 
The effectiveness of the strategy is explained on the grounds that (a) the knowledge involved in copy 
protection is generally too sophisticated for consumers to circumvent, and (b) consumers are not 
allowed to use circumvention techniques created by knowledgeable third parties. Copy protection is 
controversial, because it deprives consumers from making home copies of music and software, and 
hence overrules copyright law that exempts the copying for private use. It is argued that the technical 
enforcement of copyright protection in the home domain of millions of individuals necessitates a wide 
consensus between business and society about the legitimacy of private and fair use. 
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The magnitude of piracy 
 
More than US$ 14 billion is reportedly lost due to worldwide piracy in software and music in 2001. 
The losses claimed by the music industry amount to US$ 4.3 billion; the software industry claims US$ 
10 billion (IFPI 2002; BSA 2002). These figures primarily refer to large-scale counterfeiting 
operations by organized crime groups, which exploit entire factories to press pirate CDs, but 
increasingly also involve “garage piracy” that makes use of towers of CD burners in small-scale 
locations. Estimations of Internet piracy are highly speculative. The music industry assumes that 99% 
of the music files on-line available in 2001 was unauthorized.  
 
Several questions can be asked about the accuracy of these figures. For example, it is unlikely that 
each illegal copy displaces a sale at the market price. Many people who download a free copy, or buy 
at a pirate price, would not buy the same product at a legal market price. Another issue is that  losses 
are calculated on the basis of the estimated reduction in gross revenues rather than in net loss and 
hence may be significantly overestimated. Disputed is also the contention that free downloading and 
copying is only bad for music sales. Some musicians experience a significant positive effect from 
online file sharing1, and market research has shown that 80 per cent of music down-loaders report their 
CD purchasing either has remained the same or increased (Ipsos Reid 2002). Nonetheless, the music 
and software industries have become increasingly concerned with piracy, and have developed a 
defensive approach to digital distribution. The information technology (IT) industry even complains 
that there is no compelling content on the internet to drive the adoption of broadband technology and 
so stimulate demand for their hardware. If music and video were commercially available on the 
internet in an easy to use format, it would stimulate broadband usage and force consumers to upgrade 
their computers (Abrahams and Harding 2002).  
 
Piracy involves the unauthorized replication of copyrighted intellectual assets for commercial 
purposes. Although posing a significant problem for key industries, piracy has received little attention 
in the literature on intellectual asset management.  This is remarkable. The recognition of knowledge 
as a strategic resource for the firm has aroused a great interest in the value of intellectual assets. The 
business literature stresses the vital importance of protecting these assets legally, as intellectual 
property, in order to realize their value (Berman et al 2002; Davis and Harrison 2001; Edvinsson and 
Sullivan 1996; Glazier 2000; Petrash 1996; Pike 2001; Rivette and Kline 2000; Williams and 
Bukowitz 2001). The main theme in the literature is the potential benefit of protecting knowledge and 
information with copyright and trademarks, and, particularly, with patents. It lines out intellectual 
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asset strategies for the “new battlefields of the knowledge economy” where patents are the “smart 
bombs of tomorrow’s business wars” (Rivette and  Kline 2000: xi). The publications excitedly advice 
managers how to turn intellectual assets into profit centres, but are silent about how to manage piracy.  
 
This article analyses the efforts of the software and music industry to combat home copying and file 
sharing by copy-protection techniques. The first sections provide a theoretical explanation for copy 
protection, which is conceived as a knowledge-based strategy that deliberately employs highly 
codified knowledge to strengthen weak appropriability regimes. Then, the impact of copy protection 
on relations with other industry sectors and with consumers is discussed. Finally, questions are raised 
about how firms should manage stakeholder relations when their strategy to protect intellectual assets 
overrules traditional consumer rights to make home copies.   
 
 
Reinforcing weak appropriability regimes 
 
A concept that is helpful in analysing the piracy phenomenon is the “appropriability regime”, 
introduced by Teece (1986). The concept of appropriability regime helps to understand the limitations 
for companies to appropriate their innovations. It is determined by two factors: (a) the efficacy of 
intellectual property rights’ legislation, and (b) the opportunities for third parties to replicate the 
information (table 1). A regime is “tight” when an innovator is protected by strong patents or 
copyright, and when replication of the product is not feasible because access to the relevant 
information is blocked by trade secrets. The appropriability regime is “weak” when the protection 
conferred by the patents or copyright is limited, and when the information or the product in which it is 
embedded is easily imitated. Music and software have weak appropriability regimes. It is easy to copy 
digital music and software, the provisions in copyright law that deal with private copying are 
confusing and controversial, and the enforcement of copyright in private homes and on the Internet is 
problematic.  
 
 
Table 1. Appropriability regimes 
 
Inherent replicability  
 Easy Hard 
Loose Weak  Moderate  
 
Intellectual 
property 
rights Tight Moderate  Strong  
 
Source: Teece 1986 and 1998 
 
 
The question is whether firms are passively subjected to their weak appropriability regimes. The term 
regime suggests that the opportunities for appropriation are largely determined by factors external to 
the individual firm. Both the legal protection opportunities as well as the “inherent replicability” 
(Teece 1998) of the information involved seem to constitute a given and static environment. In reality, 
however, firms proactively attempt to increase the efficacy of the regime, either together or alone. 
They do so in two ways. Firms induce governments and judges to adjust intellectual property 
legislation, and firms raise the barriers to replication. 
 
The legal dimension of the appropriability regime continuously evolves through case law, by the 
enactment of new legislation, or by the conclusion of international agreements. These adjustments are 
largely a response to the changing requirements of industry. For example, until the 1980s, software 
code used to be only protectable under copyright law. Due to several limitations of copyright, among 
others that it does not protect against reverse engineering, the software industry elicited further 
jurisprudence resulting in software becoming also protectable under patent law in many countries. 
New copyright laws that explicitly address the protection of digital information have also been 
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adopted in the USA and - via international agreements concluded  in the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) -, in many other countries. These 
agreements have provided major opportunities for international industry associations to shape the legal 
dimension of their respective appropriability regimes in the world.  
 
The technical dimension of the regime is also strongly modelled by industry. For example, the copy-
protection techniques that are at issue in this article make replication of CDs and digital downloads by 
consumers troublesome if not impossible. But influencing the ‘replicability’ of technology is not 
solely dependent on the skills of the firm to raise technical barriers. It also requires anticipation of the 
replication capacity of potential imitators. Large or science-based companies possess sophisticated 
knowledge that enables them to reverse-engineer all knowledge that is embedded in products sold by 
their rivals and to use that knowledge to create a near imitation. Raising the replication barriers for 
these actors may be difficult. The barriers that may not keep rivals at bay, may nevertheless deter 
individuals who have less replication capacity. Apart from differences in technical capacity, the 
consequences of different forms of replication may differ, as do the causes and objectives of 
replication. All this variation is important to be taken into account when firms design strategies to 
reinforce their appropriability regimes.  
 
 
The codification dilemma  
 
An examination of the factors that determine replication requires a discussion of different forms of 
knowledge. Of particular interest is the process of knowledge codification, which refers to the 
transformation of knowledge from a tacit into an explicit form. Tacit knowledge is closely linked to 
the personal skills and experiences of individuals, while explicit knowledge is disconnected from 
individuals. Explicit knowledge is formal and systematic, and expressed in words, numbers, scientific 
procedures, or universal principles (Cohendet et al 2001: 1568) so that it can be stored on a medium.  
 
The interest in knowledge codification is motivated by two main advantages for the firm. Firstly, 
codification confers knowledge the characteristics of a commodity. In an explicit or formal form, 
knowledge can precisely be described and specified in terms of content and intellectual properties that 
reduce uncertainty and information asymmetry in transactions. In addition, codified knowledge is 
transferable independently from its creator, and can be sold or bought (Cowan and Foray 1997). An 
important implication is that the ownership of knowledge is transferred from individual employees to 
the firm’s management (Edvinsson  and Sullivan 1996; Hall 1993; Ruth and Bukowitz 2001: 101-
102). Knowledge may be stored as a database, a software programme, as a new plant variety, or as a 
patent. The bottom line is that in the stored format, knowledge becomes an asset that is owned by the 
company and put on the balance sheet. It remains with the company “when the employees leave”. 
Codification may therefore also be a management’s tactic to reduce power of skilled employees, or to 
replace them by semi-skilled personnel who can do the job by following instructions on checklists 
(Carter and Scarbrough 2000). The second advantage of codification is that it facilitates knowledge 
diffusion. Tacit knowledge is difficult to transfer. It requires person-to-person contacts, is more time 
consuming, and more expensive. Codified knowledge, in contrast, enables a quick and cheap diffusion 
of knowledge within the firm or network. Stored in databases it can be accessed by anyone in the 
company even at different locations, and facilitates the introduction of new employees (Cowan and 
Foray 1997: 596-597; Hansen et al 1999: 108-110; Teece 1998: 63).  
 
Knowledge codification also entails disadvantages. If easy replicated within the company, knowledge 
may also be replicated outside the company’s boundaries. Databases or check lists, for example, may 
be accessed without authorization by competitors. Employees may take away codified knowledge 
when they move to another firm, despite specific stipulations in their contracts. Patents raise a similar 
dilemma. Public disclosure of the invention is a condition for patent protection, which makes the 
invention consequently vulnerable to near imitation by rivals. Knowledge that is codified and 
embodied into a marketable product facilitates imitation. The opportunities for imitation increase 
when mass markets are served.  Because the product is aimed at a large number of users, it has to be 
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standardized, which means that all knowledge or art embodied in the product is fully codified. 
Information and communication technology have greatly facilitated opportunities for both codification 
and imitation, which induced some authors to speak of the “digital dilemma” (National Research 
Council 2000). This dilemma is not typical for digitized knowledge, but also applies to knowledge that 
is codified in other models and languages. For example, in agriculture the knowledge of plant 
geneticists and plant breeders is codified in the genetic code of new plant varieties. However, varieties 
are in principle easily copied by farmers who make use of plants’ natural feature to reproduce 
themselves. When codification as such facilitates diffusion of knowledge that is both beneficial and 
detrimental to the company, it is better to speak of codification dilemma. 
 
 
Diffusion requires absorption 
 
The concept of codification dilemma is based on two classic assumptions in economics: (a) that the 
cost of transmitting information is very low, and (b) that the creator of information has no means to 
exclude others from using the information he has created (Arrow 1962). Theses assumptions still 
legitimate the existence of patent and copyright law, but they are not entirely correct. The availability 
of codified knowledge may be a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for imitation.  
 
Knowledge diffusion is a social process, involving not only transmitters but also receivers of 
information. Receivers are those actors who have the capacity to absorb, i.e. to understand and employ 
the information. The process of encoding tacit knowledge must therefore recognize and anticipate the 
capabilities of targeted receivers. Such anticipation takes place in three inter-related phases that 
Cowan and Foray (1997: 604) distinguish in the codification process: 
* The creation of messages: expressing pre-existing knowledge that can be processed as  
   information; 
* The creation of models: the reorganization (different modelling) of knowledge in order to  
   transform it into information;   
* Language development: developing a language infrastructure that suits the specific  
   knowledge, such as music, mathematics, expert systems, and novels. 
During the codification process, transmitters of knowledge have to encode their messages in the 
models and language that is understood in the receiving network or community. Receivers, in turn,  
must be capable to read the language and, to a certain extent, also the model underlying it. However, 
learning ‘the code’ of codified knowledge (i.e. its language and model), and building up capabilities to 
absorb and imitate that knowledge requires time and resources (Cohendet et al. 2001: 1573-1576; 
Saviotti 1998: 848; Teece 1998: 65). One factor that influences the absorption capability of receivers 
is the life cycle of the technology. The group of actors that is able to build up capabilities grows as the 
technology matures. In technological evolution, the emergence of a dominant design heralds the 
beginning of the paradigmatic phase (Teece 1986: 287). This is a relatively stable period in which 
knowledge is standardized and codified. In this phase, an increasing number of people learn to imitate 
or modify the dominant design (Cowan and Foray 1997: 595; Saviotti 1998).  
 
Insight in the phases of the codification process enables us to challenge the classic assumption 
concerning the very low cost of information transmission. Codified knowledge is not automatically 
diffused, but depends on the absorption capability of receivers. Given the skewed distribution of time 
and resources over any population, capabilities to understand and imitate codified information are not 
equally distributed. Yet, the number of actors that is able to understand ‘the code’ grows when 
technology matures. In the context of digital piracy these conclusions imply that we can expect 
different levels of knowledge of ‘the code’ of relevant information among (potential) imitators of 
music and software. Potential imitators consequently differ in their capability to replicate. A 
distinction can be made between ‘inner circle imitators’ and ‘outer circle imitators’ (Table 2).  
 
Inner circle imitators possess the knowledge of the language and the underlying model that is required 
to reverse-engineer a product, to imitate the product, or to circumvent or decode any protective device 
that the innovative firm has installed to impede imitation. They all know ‘the code’. Inner circle 
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imitators encompass engineers from rival firms, university scientists, public sector professionals, 
students, technicians for whom hacking and imitation is a hobby, and engineers employed by criminal 
organizations who want to seize a share of the market. They do normally not form a community, 
because of contrasting interests, objectives, and values. Nevertheless, coalitions may arise among 
some of them when they can benefit from imitation in the outer circle.  
Outer circle imitators include individual consumers who imitate a product for private purposes, 
including non-commercial exchange of imitations among family, friends, and “netizens”. They do not 
have advanced knowledge about the technology involved, but they may acquire specialized devices 
that do the job for them. Such equipment becomes available as the technology matures and companies 
begin producing standardized products for mass markets. The devices embody sophisticated, codified 
knowledge that, in itself, need not to be understood to get them running. Outer circle imitators know 
‘the code’ to start devices that can read the language and model of the codified information and hence 
facilitate imitation. Examples of such devices vary from standard copy-paste buttons in web browsers 
and PC operating systems, to CD burners, and the specialized software that enables circumvention of 
copy-protection devices. Outer circle imitators do not form a community either, but they share an  
interest in maintaining freedom to make private copies, or exchange copies over the Internet. Their 
‘natural allies’ within the inner circle are the information technology (IT) and consumer electronics 
companies because they make decoding devices available. 
     
 
 
Table 2. Two circles of imitators 
 
 Inner circle imitators Outer circle imitators 
 
Type of actors Rival companies, criminal organizations, 
professionals, knowledgeable individuals 
Individual consumers 
Number of actors Limited number and identifiable  Millions of individuals spread over 
the globe 
Imitation interest - Rival firms: reverse engineering to improve 
own process R&D 
- Criminal organizations: seizing share of a 
profitable market  
- Professionals: improving personal 
knowledge and status 
- Hackers: fun, status or political goal 
Making copies for private use, more 
and new music available at low price 
Scope copyright law Commercial imitation forbidden Imitation for private use exempted 
Definition of private use differs per 
country and is not clear 
Enforcement copyright Infringement is - in principle- traceable Infringement hardly traceable  
Effectiveness copy-
protection 
Low; technical device easily decoded High; technical device works as 
‘speed bump’ 
Legal support copy-
protection 
Research on, and diffusion of decoding 
knowledge forbidden 
Use of decoding knowledge 
forbidden 
 
 
Apart from their skills and purposes, both groups of imitators differ in size. Inner circle imitators are 
relatively small in number and in principle traceable when they start distributing imitations on the 
market. It is this group of imitators that is usually focused at in intellectual asset management 
literature. Outer circle imitators, however, include millions of individuals across the globe. Their 
copying acts can hardly be traced, and their possible violation of intellectual property rights cannot be 
determined. Efforts to reduce imitation by outer circle imitators focus therefore on technical barriers, 
i.e. on raising the level of knowledge required for imitation. 
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Raising the barriers to replication  
 
Attempts to impede replication directly challenge the assumption of neoclassical economists as that 
the creator of information has no means to exclude others from using that information. When the 
diffusion of codified information also depends on the absorption capability of receivers, creators of 
information have a chance to solve the codification dilemma. They could increase control over the use 
that third parties make from their information by reducing the chances that the information is absorbed 
by outer circle imitators. At least four approaches can be distinguished. 
 
1. Firms could make knowledge of the product-related ‘code’ irrelevant for imitation. They offer their 
codified product in a package, mixed with “complementary assets”, such as marketing, competitive 
manufacturing, or after-sales support (Teece 1986). Uniqueness of the package mix, or the inclusion of 
highly competitive assets makes the complete package difficult to imitate, and improves the firm’s 
conditions for appropriation.  
 
2. Firms could generate and use highly specialized codes consisting of technical or local jargon that 
can only be understood by a select group of actors, and create obstacles to imitation (Cowan and Foray 
1997: 599; Cohendet et al. 2001: 1568).  In this case, codification has two objectives: to share the 
knowledge among a certain group (firms, scientists), and to keep others out.  
 
3. Firms could invest more in knowledge creation to "push the frontier of knowledge as fast as 
possible" (Saviotti 1998: 850). This approach aims to reduce the number of actors that know ‘the 
code’ by exploiting lead-time advantage. As it is likely that new, advanced knowledge is more tacit 
and the number of actors who have access to it limited, this strategy diminishes opportunities for 
imitation.  
 
4. Firms could block the access to the codified and standardized product with a secretive key. In this 
approach the number of actors that know the product-specific ‘code’ is irrelevant. By including an 
additional piece of encoded knowledge in the product that can only be decoded by a select group of 
the company’s employees, imitation of the product is impossible for as long as the key remains a 
secret. 
 
All four approaches intend to solve the codification dilemma and so strengthen the appropriability 
regime. They may be used separately but usually in combination with each other. The first approach is 
almost always employed. Since software and music is more than just millions of bits, companies have 
various opportunities to offer unique packages that stimulate the purchase of legal copies. Software 
consumers require readable manuals to get the programmes running, and favour reliable after-sales 
services. Music fans often prefer a CD with original cover and booklet that informs about the 
musicians and lyrics. These complementary assets are vulnerable, however. Counterfeiters imitate the 
music as well as the printed documentation in a way that is very similar to the original. Moreover, CD 
covers and booklets are favoured items for shoplifters (Doorduyn 2002). The latter three approaches 
form the basis of copy-protection techniques. 
 
 
Copy protection as “speed bump” 
 
The key problem of digital intellectual assets is that they can be replicated without change of 
properties. Digital information may be copied across media - from hard discs to various formats floppy 
discs or tape -, or may be sent across networks without any serious loss of quality. The copies are 
identical to their original source. This situation contrasts with the past in which content could only be 
distributed as analogue work that was attached to a physical medium, a printed book, or tape. Copies 
could be made within and across media, but not without a loss of properties. Unique to the digital 
world is that “content is liberated” from its physical medium (National Research Council 2000: 32-
33). Moreover, particularly in the entertainment sector the liberation of content has increased the 
demand for home copying. Copies are wanted either for time-shifting purposes - recording a television 
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programme to watch it later -, or for space-shifting purposes - reading, viewing or listening to the 
protected work through other devices, such as computers, DVD players, game consoles like 
PlayStation, MP3 players, high-end stereo equipment, and car CD players. 
 
Copy-protection techniques limit the freedom of consumers to make copies of digital information. 
They intend to contain the ‘liberated’ content again, and make access to content subjected to control of 
the copyright holder. Digital Rights Management (DRM) involves a rights model for access to Web-
based content. DRM creates various levels of permission for different recipients and controls. It 
regulates for example who is authorized to use, view or listen to the protected work; how often it can 
be viewed or listened to; from which computer; and how many copies can be made. Copyright holders 
use a wide variety of techniques intended to regain control over their content. The most often used 
techniques are shortly explained in Exhibit 1. 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 1 Copy-protection techniques 
 
Encryption  The information or content is encrypted to transmit it in this form to the receiver. Only the 
receiver has the key to decrypt the information. Newer systems make sure that the protected file appears 
in decrypted form only on-screen and never in the random access memory, where computers look into 
when it is trying to print or copy. This approach blocks copy opportunities during transmission and at the 
receiving PC. 
 
Distortion Digital distortion is inserted into the sound files of music CDs. It is not audible as long as the 
CD is played in an audio player, but degrades the sound when the tracks are copied into a digital format 
and played from a PC’s hard drive. 
  
Anchoring The content or information is ‘anchored’ to a specific programme, user or machine. When 
anchored to a programme, the document or sound can only be viewed or listened to by using a specific 
browser plug-in, which is not capable of copying, writing to the disk, printing etc. Examples are Adobe’s 
eBook Reader and Microsoft’s Windows Media. More effective control is achieved when the content is 
anchored to an identifiable user or PC, which are authorized to decrypt the information. Special decoding 
hardware with a unique identifier may also be installed in the PC. 
 
Trusted systems These involve comprehensive end-to end systems that offer information security and 
hence facilitate transparency between users and also control digital intellectual property. The main 
example of a trusted system is the decoder in pay-per-view television. It requires a new design of 
operation systems, and massive collaboration among software and hardware industries to make such 
systems operational in computers.  
 
Digital watermarks Encoded ownership information is added to the protected work, visible or invisible. 
Aim of digital watermarks is not preventing copying, but deterrence, monitoring and collecting evidence 
for possible infringement. Digital watermarking works in combination with “Web crawlers”, special 
software programmes that systematically search the Internet for documents with a relevant watermark. 
Machine code for software cannot be watermarked, because the alterations to the code might let 
computers crash. 
 
Spoofing This is the latest tactic of the music industry to attack the peer-to-peer music networks. The 
record companies deluge popular P2P music services with thousands of decoy music files that look 
identical to a sought-after song, but are filled with long minutes of silence or 30-second loops of a song's 
chorus. 
 
Sources: National Research Council 2000: 157-167; Roush 2002. 
 
 8
The common denominator of the different protection techniques is that they strategically use highly 
specialized, codified knowledge to raise the barriers to imitation. The protection ‘code’ is too 
advanced for most outer circle imitators to be circumvented. Specialized codes, jargon, latest 
innovations and trade secrets are used to exclude outer circle imitators from access. The level of 
sophistication of the protection techniques may vary greatly, but for outer circle imitators they all 
make imitation so cumbersome that buying legal copies is an attractive alternative. Experts therefore 
believe that copy-protection systems work as a “speed-bump”, by frustrating copy efforts of large 
numbers of individual consumers (O’Connell 2002). 
 
The knowledge-based approach to impede imitation is also vulnerable. It suffers from inner-outer 
circle collaboration in circumventing protection, and from the absence of industry-wide standards for 
copy protection. Inner-outer circle collaboration is problematic for copyright holders because inner 
circle knowledge is transferred and diffused into the outer circle where it is used to break copy 
protection. Hackers, professionals, academic researchers, advanced students, and other knowledgeable 
individuals, have the capacity to design and distribute circumventing devices. This knowledge sharing 
between the inner and outer circle obstructs the knowledge-based approach to reducing imitation. An 
obvious example of recent inner-outer circle collaboration is the CD burner that replicates CDs which 
once were thought to be copy-proof. But there are more examples.  
 
In October 2001, the code of Microsoft’s DRM was cracked by an anonymous hacker. He placed a 
circumvention programme on the Internet, according to the attached letter, with the explicit intention 
to facilitate home copying. The software of the hacker allows someone who purchases a CD with 
Windows Media files on it to strip off the protections and distribute the files online (Borland 2001). 
Another example concerns the Content Scrambling System (CSS), a copy-protection device of DVDs. 
In November 1999, the CSS encryption scheme was broken, when two programmers found out that 
one manufacturer had not encrypted the decryption key in the software of its DVD player. 
Examination of the software enabled them to break the protection of that particular player, and 
provided them insight into the encryption keys used by other players (National Research Council 
2000: 172). A free, Windows-based protection circumventing utility, called DeCSS, became 
subsequently available on the Internet. The third example of inner-outer collaboration involves the 
copy-protected CDs that Sony began to sell, late 2001. Within a few months Internet newsgroups 
spread the message that Sony’s copy protection could be circumvented by simply scribbling around 
the rim of a CD with a felt tip marker (Reuters 2002). 
 
To solve this weak aspect of copy protection, the software and entertainment industry resorted to the 
government. Legislation was designed to thwart further inner-outer circle collaboration in cracking 
copy protection. The USA was the first country that outlawed the design of measures that circumvent 
copy-protection techniques. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), adopted in 1998, 
includes two regulations for this purpose: The access-control provision, which prohibits the 
circumvention of technical protection measures used by copyright holders to control access to their 
works, and the anti-device provisions, which bans devices that are designed or produced primarily for 
purposes of circumventing technical protection measures. DMCA-like legislation was subsequently 
also introduced in many other countries that adhere to the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT). In the 
European Union, anti-circumvention has become forbidden with the adoption of the European Union 
Copyright Directive (EUCD), which must be implemented in the member states by the end of 2002.   
 
The second weak point in copy protection is the absence of an industry-wide consensus on a 
technology standard. Attempts to achieve such a standard have foundered so far. The main example is 
the Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI) that started in 1998 to find an effective response to music 
piracy. Around 200 companies from the recording and technology industries worked together to secure 
digital songs, but failed to produce commercial results. The boom of file-sharing applications, such as 
Napster and KaZaA, overtook the companies involved, while none of the copy-control systems SDMI 
released survived the hackers who were invited to crack the code. The main problem in the SDMI was, 
however, the opposing interests of the industries involved.  The entertainment industry covers the 
copyright holders. They aim at effective DRM systems that make unauthorized copying virtually 
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impossible, and have a common interest in blocking imitation by consumers. The Information 
Technology (IT) industry has an interest in selling PCs to consumers. And consumers demand PCs on 
which music playback is possible and which can be used to store other copyright-protected works. 
Some observers speak of a divide between ‘Hollywood’ and ‘Silicon Valley’. The IT industry would 
perceive protection of copyrights primarily the business of the entertainment industry, which should 
respond to the present imitation challenges with a different business model. The entertainment 
industry replies that there is no business model that enables competition when the products are 
elsewhere available for free (Harmon 2002). The third sector is the consumer electronics industry that 
has a specific interest in home copying because they sell DVD recorders, MP3 players, and CD 
players. The prime interest of consumer electronics industry is that copy-protection techniques and 
DRM systems are compatible with the various types of hardware. This requires a widely accepted 
technology standard.  
 
The failure of the industry to reach consensus over a copy protection and DRM standard has resulted 
in demands for government intervention. Much to the satisfaction of the American entertainment 
industry, US senator Hollings, in March 2002, introduced a bill that would require manufacturers of 
devices ranging from PCs to VCRs to implement copy protection in their devices. The bill is bitterly 
opposed by the technology industry (Abrahams and Harding 2002). The European Commission so far 
has confined itself by urging the industry to come up with a solution quickly. 
 
In the absence of a standard, various companies have begun experimenting with copy-protection. By 
the end of 2001, the five major record companies set up two separate DRM-based subscription 
services for music: Pressplay, which offers songs from Sony, EMI and Universal, and MusicNet 
offering artists from the labels of EMI, Warner and BMG. These services were introduced as legal 
alternatives for notorious file-sharing services like Morpheus, KaZaA and Grokster. Both Pressplay 
and MusicNet are highly cumbersome for consumers. The music offered with both services is limited 
to what is offered by their own labels, the music is incompatible with existing software, and is 
expensive ($2 for an individual song). Pressplay allows customers to burn 10 songs to a CD each 
month, but only two songs from the same artist. In 2001, the record companies also began selling 
copy-protected CDs, mainly in Europe. Universal has released 2 million copy-protected CDs in 
Germany, but kept the technology confined to non-blockbuster albums. Sony Music Europe shipped 
11 million copy-protected CDs, including albums from celebrities such as Celine Dion, Jennifer Lopez 
and Shakira.  
 
Until present, the rate of success in digital protection devices is generally low. Apart from code 
cracking and other circumvention methods, protected CDs sometimes failed to play on some audio 
equipment, or made computers crash. BMG has already switched back production to "clean" 
unprotected CDs, following consumer complaints (Abrahams and Harding 2002). 
 
 
Opposition to copy protection 
 
The copy-protected CDs and DRM systems have been hailed with criticism. The "stealth CDs", as the 
protected CDs have been dubbed by opponents, have provoked considerable public opposition. The 
web pages of American and European civil society organizations, such as the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, Home Recording Rights Coalition, DigitalConsumer.org, Eurorights.org, the Free 
Software Foundation, and the European Consumers’ Organization BEUC2, reflect a broad disapproval 
of the growing control of copyright holders. None of the organizations opposes copyright protection as 
such, but they all are concerned about the restrictions to the legal right of consumers to use content 
that they have legally purchased. They defend the legitimacy of making private copies for time 
shifting and place shifting purposes to use them on the large variety of audio-visual and computer 
equipment, from VCR to lap top.  
 
The consumer criticism on copy protection and DRM addresses a highly contentious issue of 
copyright, namely non-commercial copying for private use. Private use is part of a number of 
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exemptions under copyright laws. In most countries copyright is limited in that some forms of non-
commercial or private use of protected material do not require authorization and the payment of 
royalties. Usually are exempted the copying for personal use, some copying for scientific purposes - 
such as quoting -, and some use of protected material in the public interest - such as lending by 
libraries. In the USA and UK these exceptions are known as “fair use” respectively “fair dealing”. 
However, the boundaries of what constitutes private or fair use are far from clear and seem to evolve 
in time.  
 
Economists argue that the rationale for the private use exemption is one of sheer necessity. A normal 
market for copies of copyrighted work failed to develop, because the transaction costs incurred by 
enforcing the rights and the sale of copies to individual consumers exceeded the value of the copies. 
Instead, governmental intervention created a ‘market’ (Towse 2000: 15).  In many countries royalty 
collecting societies were founded that took over the clearance, royalty collection and enforcement 
from individual right holders. Most European countries and the USA also introduced levies on blank 
media, such as cassettes and CDs, or on digital devices that can be used for copying. The purpose of 
the levy system is to collect money to compensate copyright holders for legitimate copies made by 
individuals. The collected money is distributed back to record companies and broadcasters, estimating 
the payments by examining record sales and the programme logs of broadcasters.  
 
The emergence of copy-protection techniques and DRM systems challenges both the fair use 
exemptions as well as government intervention. Following the economists logic, the introduction of 
DRM and copy protection reduces transaction costs for both enforcing copyrights and the sale of 
individual copies just to a level that the costs no longer exceed the value of an individual copy. A 
market could then emerge, making continued government intervention in the music market 
superfluous. This argument would explain the strong demands to abolish the levy on blank media by 
the entertainment and the IT industry during a DRM workshop in Europe (European Commission 
2002). The levy system is loathed by the entertainment industry because of its “rough justice”, the IT 
industry opposes levies for reason that it raises the sales price of its products, and consumers 
organizations are concerned that the co-existence of both the levy and DRM systems makes consumers 
pay twice. 
  
More controversial, however, remains the issue of private copying. The new technology deprives 
consumers from their opportunities to make personal copies of protected work. This has given rise to 
two opposing positions. On the one hand are the copyright holders who hold that this limitation of 
copyright was borne out of necessity, and that the private use exemption was therefore only 
temporary. New technologies change the rules of the game. Consumers have to adjust their 
expectations and behaviour to the new realities, and must pay for using protected work. On the other 
hand are the consumer and civil society organizations, supported by the IT and consumer electronics 
industry. They consider the private use exception an affirmative right of consumers. Consumers 
should retain the freedom to privately use purchased items, as they like.  
 
Due to the controversy about private and fair use, the new copyright laws that have been adopted in 
the USA and Europe do not establish clear rules. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act is vague 
whether or not circumvention of protection devices is permitted to enable fair use (NRC 2000: 174, 
318), and the EUCD provides a long list of exceptions in view of private use, which are optional for 
EU member states to include into their national laws. 
 
Closely related to the private use issue is the discussion over the anti-circumvention provisions in the 
new copyright laws. Many American academics believe the DMCA discourages scientists from 
publishing in the area of encryption through the fear of legal action inspired by the DMCA (Knight 
2002). Opponents refer to recent incidents involving the DMCA. In September 2000, the music 
industry collaborating in the Secure Digital Management Initiative (SDMI) had posted music samples 
that carried digital watermarks on its website, and offered $10,000 to anyone who could crack the 
code. A team of American researchers, led by Edward Felten, professor digital security at Princeton 
University, took up the challenge and quickly claimed success. He forfeited the prize money to avoid 
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signing a secrecy agreement, and planned to reveal the methodology at an international conference in 
Pittsburg. The American Recording Industry then sent Felten an intimidating letter stating that such a 
presentation could be seen as a violation of anti-circumvention regulations under the DMCA (Fox 
2001). The other incident involved the Russian scientist Sklyarov, who went to the United States to 
present a paper on cryptography. Sklyarov is an employee of Elcom Ltd. and was charged with 
“trafficking” in software designed to circumvent copy protections in Adobe’s eBook Reader software, 
which is a criminal violation of the DMCA. He was arrested, and only after a huge public furore, was 
allowed to go home. But the charges against his company were not dropped. Elcome’s software could 
be used to make illegal copies of an ebook protected by Adobe, but it could also be seen as restoring 
fair use rights that Adobe’s programme prevents (Wildstrom 2002).   
 
 
Implications for Intellectual Asset Management 
 
The key issue in the civil society opposition to copy protection and DRM is that software code has 
achieved a higher status than legal code, or in the words of Lessig (1999) “code has become law”. 
According to Lessig, software code regulates all aspects of our life, more pervasively than any other 
regulator. Initially, Internet software code overruled the system of legal protection, and created liberty 
for consumers. Future code, however, will create architecture of centralized control, if everyone using 
the Internet is going to be identified, their actions tracked, their actions restricted by code. However, 
the main problem, says Lessig, is not the regulating impact of software code, but the absence of 
democratic decision-making. Legal protection requires political decisions that may seek a balance 
between private and public interests. As it come to technological content protection, it is up to the 
private company to balance the different interests. Lessig speaks of West Coast code - the software 
from Silicon Valley - that overrules East Coast code - the legislation from Washington. The impact 
may be bigger. Considering the worldwide diffusion of American software, the reality is that the 
American West Coast code supersedes not only America’s national laws, but also those of most 
countries in the world.  
 
The implications for intellectual asset managers are immense. Lawyers are used to legal battles with 
rival companies and criminal organizations that are behind the large-scale piracy operations. These 
operations might be complicated, enduring and expensive, but they are also relatively well ordered and 
the legal departments are equipped to handle them. Knowledge-based protection of intellectual assets 
changes this situation, because copy protection inherently involves political issues. When technical 
protection overrules the law, industry claims superiority over the legislator. As a result, civil society 
demands for democratic decision-making will directly be addressed to the industry, and requires the 
legal departments to prepare themselves for a battle that is primarily political in character, and 
involves millions or even billions of individual potential opponents across the globe. These opponents 
also happen to be customers, and that means the corporate image is at stake. It seems therefore 
inevitable that knowledge-based protection of intellectual assets is integrated into an interdisciplinary 
corporate strategy, which avoids a fight with the industry’s primary stakeholders, and initiates an open 
dialogue with civil society on what should be the values and norms with respect to non-commercial 
copying and file exchange of copyrighted work for private use. 
 
Notes 
 
1 See the critical article on the music industry’s approach of online music by the artist Janis Ian. The article 
“Risky Business. The Internet Debacle: An Alternative View” was published in the June 2002 issue of the 
Performing Songwriter Magazine and can be downloaded from Ian’s homepage: www.janisian.com  
 
2 See the websites of these organizations: www.eff.org, www.hrrc.org, www.digitalconsumer.org, 
www.eurorights.org, www.fsf.org, www.beuc.org. 
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